Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 2 Law & Social Change

Article 2

January 2003

Defining Hospitality Entities in Contracts and
Statutes: A Proactive and Preventative Approach
Andrea Bastian
Stephen Barth

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Contracts Commons
Recommended Citation
Andrea Bastian and Stephen Barth, Defining Hospitality Entities in Contracts and Statutes: A Proactive and Preventative Approach, 33
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (2003).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss2/2

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Bastian and Barth: Hospitality Entities in Contracts

COMMENT
DEFINING HOSPITALITY
ENTITIES IN CONTRACTS AND
STATUTES:
A PROACTIVE AND

PREVENTATIVE APPROACH

"The sine qua non of a life in the law is a willingness to devote
a great deal of thought to issues which seldom concern
nonlawyers."l

INTRODUCTION

The concept of a hospitality entity, such as a "restaurant"
or "hotel," is something that ordinary people (non-lawyers)
have little difficulty describing, but which has long created a
legal quandary for attorneys, courts, and legislatures. The
struggle to specifically discern the nature of certain hospitality
entities is the bane of hospitality law, particularly inns, hotels,
and motels from the lodging segment, and restaurants,
nightclubs, bars, and cabarets from the food and beverage
spectrum.
Statutes and contracts use hospitality classifications and
definitions to accomplish particular objectives. 2 For example,
to minimize neighborhood noise and traffic problems, a lease
may restrict the use of the premises for a "nightclub," but allow

1
Tily B., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 10·11 (Cal. Ct.
App.1998).

2

JACKP. JEFFERIES, UNDERSTANDING HOSPITALITY LAW 6 (3rd ed.1995).

105
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"restaurant" activity.3
A breach of the lease becomes
debatable, however, when components detailing the definition
Would the
of "restaurant" or "nightclub" are omitted.
restaurant owner breach the lease for operating a nonpermitted nightclub if she served alcoholic beverages and
allowed dancing? Like many hospitality entities, nightclubs
and restaurants share similar elements. 4 In the absence of
specific terms, reasonable minds differ as to the definitions.5
The multiplicity and diversity of characteristics in the
modern hospitality industry contribute to the foggy nature of
hospitality definitions.
As a result, the parties often
unintentionally violate the law or infringe a contract. 6 For
instance, in State v. Shoaf, suit was brought against an owner
to enforce a public law that restricted the sale of goods on
Sundays.7
The applicable statute, which exempted
"restaurants" and "cafes," did not narrowly define either term.S
The state believed that the owner's business was a "wiener
joint," not a true "restaurant," because there were no tables
and he sold only hotdogs and sandwiches at a counter.9
Referencing historical definitions from a dictionary, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina found the premises was a
"restaurant."lO The court reasoned that the word "restaurant"
is commonly understood as "a place where refreshments can be
had,"ll whereas a "joint" is a rendezvous "for persons engaged
in evil and secret practices of any kind ... as is usually kept by
Chinese for the accommodation of persons addicted to the habit
of opium."12 This interpretation protected the business from
closing on Sundays.13 Elusive definitions of hospitality entities,

Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. App. 1989).
Id. at 864.
5 Id.
6 State v. Shoaf, 102 S.E. 705 (N.C. 1920).
7 Id.
BId. at 706.
9
Id.
10 Id. at 705.
11
Id.
12 Id. at 706.
13 Id. The court found that the policy of the statute barring restaurants from
opening on Sunday was not violated, because the owner did not "mar in the least the
proper and peaceful observance of the Sabbath." Id.
3

4
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such as the distinctions between a "wiener joint" and a
"restaurant," often create confusion and lead to litigation,14
Litigants often argue that a hospitality term in a contract
or statute is too vague to be enforced. 15 When interpreting a
vague term, however, courts make every effort to discern the
intent of the parties from the remnants of the contract or
statute. 16 Accordingly, courts construe vague or undefined
hospitality terms utilized in contracts and statutes by their
"commonly understood meanings."17 This is a difficult task for
courts, because hospitality entities have nebulous "commonly
understood meanings" due to the numerous characteristics
they share. 18 Adding to the confusion, the evolution of legal
language and colloquial language is not always concurrent. 19
The mountain of judicial opinions attempting to establish
"commonly understood meanings" of hospitality entities is
indicative of the difficulty courts have in distinguishing
between them.
Likewise, the consequences of after-the-fact judicial
interpretation of the definition of an entity can be severe. 20
Courts will not interpret the definition of an entity where it is
unambiguous. 21 To best prevent litigation, definitions should
Utilizing
be composed with clear and specific terms. 22
restrictive covenants and permitted uses in the definition
allows drafters to explicitly describe the permitted operations
of hospitality entities. In addition to achieving the objectives
of the statute or contract, affected parties will easily
See generally State v. Shoaf, 102 S.E. 705 (N.C. 1920).
Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App. 1989).
16 Id at 866.
17 See generally JACK P. JEFFERIES, UNDERSTANDING HOSPITALITY LAw 6 (3rd ed.
1995); Oak Hills Prop. v. Saga Rest. Inc, 940 S.W.2d 243,245 (Tex. App. 1997); Adams
v. Fazzio Real Estate Co., 268 F. Supp. 630, 635 (E.D. La. 1967).
18
See generally Montella v. City of Ottertail, 633 N.W.2d 86, 89-90 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001). The court struggled to determine if a business that sold desserts and coffee was
a "restaurant" under a liquor license statute. Id.
19 See generally Cromwell v. Stephens 2 Daly (N.Y.) 15, 3 Abb. Pro 26 (Ct. C.P. N.Y.
Co. 1867), reprinted in JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF INNKEEPERS 17 (3rd 1993).
20 Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex. App. 1989). The trial
court issued a permanent injunction that enjoined the business from operating as a
"nightclUb." [d.
21 . Roe v. Hopper, 408 P.2d 161, 164 (Idaho 1965).
22 Vitolo V. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). It is often difficult for
courts to tell whether the business is the allowable entity or only of the same character
as the allowable entity (hence allowable only by exception). For example, is a "diner" a
"restaurant" or just in the nature of a "restaurant?" Id.
14

15
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understand the operational scope of the entity that they are
expected to run. 23
This Comment serves as a guide to contracting parties and
legislative drafters to initially, in an accurate and descriptive
manner, define the scope of the entity, and thus, avoid
litigation.
Additionally, the factors enumerated through
permissive uses and restrictive covenants (such as a dancing or
minimum stay requirement) if utilized, will enhance the
enforceability of the statutes and contractual restrictive
covenants.
Part I describes the general background of the need for
specificity in arriving at definitions for hospitality entities. 24
Part II explains why the court's use of historical definitions in
interpreting vague or missing definitions of hospitality
establishments in contracts and statutes is unsound. 25 Part III
examines why an entity's characteristics are relevant, focusing
on specific issues arising in contractual and statutory arenas. 26
Part IV provides a logical progression for clearly defining each
term of art by the use of specific permissive and restrictive
covenants. 27 Part V concludes that a proactive utilization of
these covenants by all affected stakeholders prevents
litigation. 2B

1. BACKGROUND
Early hospitality entities were much simpler to classify
than the melange of entities comprising the industry today.29
It appears that all present day hospitality entities evolved from
an "inn," but even the concept of an "inn" took a long time to
develop. 30 In the ancient Middle East, empty huts gave shelter
to traders along caravan stopS.31
In the Middle Ages,
23 See generally Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex. App.
1989).
24 See infra notes 29 ·66 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 67·108 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 109·191 and accompanying text.
27 See infra accompanying text and chart.
28 See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
29 See generally Cromwell v. Stephens 2 Daly (N.Y.) 15, 3 Abb. Pro 26 (Ct. C.P. N.Y.
Co. 1867), reprinted in JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF INNKEEPERS 17 (3rd 1993).
80 Id.
3! Inn, ENCYCLOPEDIA. COM, available at
<http://www.encyclopedia.comihtml/illinn.asp.> (last visited Sept.14, 2002).
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monasteries established hospices to fulfill the Christian duty of
hospitality by providing accommodations and food for
travelers. 32 Less primitive inns arrived by the sixteenth
century.33 Beginning in this period, guests, in addition to
receiving overnight accommodations, expected greater services
such as a place to stable their horse and a supply of food and
drink during their stay.34
Hotels opening in the early 1800's enhanced the public's
accommodation by providing not only rooms for the night, but
also food and beverage service, soap and water for each room,
bellboys, and room service. 35 The infant industry blossomed
with the industrial revolution, automobiles, and cross-country
highways. 36 In addition, the engine of technology improved
services with inventions such as indoor plumbing and
refrigerators. 37 As a result, guests anticipated broad-based
facilities including retail outlets, in-house laundry, garage
facilities, and entertainment. 38
As the concept of public accommodation continued to
evolve, numerous characteristics among traditionally separate
entities applied to new entities. 39 Soon after, conflicts arose
concerning the classifications of hospitality entities. In 1905, a
plaintiff, who had been living in the Ten Eyck Annex, a hotel in
New York, for seventeen months, brought a liability suit for
lost and damaged property.40 She argued that the Ten Eyck
Annex had many of the same characteristics of an "inn" and
was, accordingly, subject to liability laws that only applied to
inns.41 The hotel argued that, historically, transient guests
32

Cromwell v. Stephens 2 Daly (N.Y.) 15, 3 Abb. Pro 26 (Ct. C.P. N.Y. Co. 1867),

reprinted in JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE LAwS OF INNKEEPERS 17 (3rd 1993).
33 WILLIAM S. GRAY, HOTEL AND MOTEL MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS 3-4 (3rd ed
1994).
34
[d.
35 John Mariani, A Look Back: milestones in the hospitality industry history, HOTEL
& MOTEL MANAGEMENT, June 5, 2000; WILLIAM S. GRAY, HOTEL AND MOTEL
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS 5·6 (3rd ed 1994).
36 See generally John Mariani, Roadside Attractions; History of Diners, RESTAURANT
HOSPITALITY, May, 1992.
37

38

[d.
See generally WILLIAM S. GRAY, HOTEL AND MOTEL MANAGEMENT AND

OPERATIONS 156·162 (3rd ed 1994).
39 See generally YMCA of Greater N.Y. McBurney Branch
518 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
40 Crapo V. Rockwell, 48 Misc. 1, 5 (N.Y. Trial Term 1905).
41

V.

Plotkin, 519 N.Y.S.2d

See generally [d.
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stayed at inns while hotels tended to house long term guests or
"tenants."42 If the court classified the Ten Eyck Annex as an
"inn," the owner, as the insurer of a transient guest's property
pursuant to the concept of infra hospitium,43 would be liable for
the plaintiffs loss under common law. 44 To determine if the
Ten Eyck Annex corresponde'd to the commonly understood
meaning of "inn," the court examined historical definitions of
the term.45 The New York Supreme Court, relying on historical
definitions, found that an "inn" was always used in connection
with the corresponding notion of travelers (transient guests)
seeking accommodation and protection. 46 The plaintiff was
more in the nature of a tenant at the hotel rather than a
transient guest of an "inn."47 Accordingly, the hotel was not
liable for the woman's property.48 If the facts of this case were
considered today, a different outcome would most likely result,
because hotels have evolved from long term tenancies into
transient guest lodging.
More recently, courts have had increasing difficulty
defining entities pursuant to the industry's constant evolution.
For example, in the hotel sector, a facility with rooms, outfitted
with spas and mirrored ceilings, are rented to members in fourhour blocks. 49 If the court regarded the premises as a "hotel" or
a "motel," an occupancy tax of five percent would apply. 50
Although many properties defined as hotels do not require an
overnight stay,51 a federal appellate court held that the entity
was not a "hotel" or a "motel," but a "private place of enhanced
romantic surroundings for sexual activity between two
persons" and, accordingly, not subject to the tax. 52
42

Id. at 4.

STEPHEN BARTH, HOSPITALITY LAw, John Wiley and Sons, 271 (2001).
Historically, the common law held a hotel liable for the loss of the guest's property if
the property and the guest were within the premises of the hotel. The concept was infra
hospitium a Latin term meaning "within the hotel." Id.
44
Crapo v. Rockwell, 48 Misc. 1, 2 (N.Y. Trial Term 1905).
45 Id. at 4.
Historical definitions are often analyzed to discover a commonly
understood meaning. Id.
43

46

47
48

Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.

49 Lucio Guerrero, Is Getaway a Hotel, There's No Telling, CHICAGO SUN·TIMES
NEWS, Oct 31, 2000, at 10.
50

5!
52

Id.
Id.
Id.
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The conception of food and beverage entities evolves at a
pace as rapidly as the lodging sector. The first restaurants,
independent of inns, that operated with a shade of modernity,
with private tables and a somewhat varied menu, appeared in
France in the late eighteenth century.53 In America, customary
restaurant entities did not develop until 1838 when the Swiss
Del-Monico brothers opened the still-famous Delmonico's
restaurant in New York. 54 As modern variations of restaurants
mushroomed in America, disagreements and resulting
litigation arose over the characteristics of eating and drinking
establishments. 55 As early as 1859, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire questioned whether a saloon serving only beer and
oysters matched the definition of a "restaurant" within a city
ordinance. 56 The ordinance did not allow any person to "keep
open any restaurant, or any place used as a restaurant, in the
city, in the night, after ten o'clock."57 The court held that the
saloon was a restaurant even though no definition of
"restaurant" was detailed in the ordinance. 58 As a result, the
owner was not allowed to operate his business past ten
o'clock. 59
Changes in modes of life, travel and transportation
continue to modify the composition of hospitality entities and
consequently, their definitions.60 The explosion of creativity in
the industry over the years has resulted in shared common
. characteristics between traditionally separate entities. For
example, if you linger too long in Miyagi's Sushi Restaurant in
Los Angeles, California, you may find yourself suddenly
transported to a nightclub as the temperature inside gently
rises, the music becomes increasingly louder, and patrons start
to dance. The restaurant transforms into a nightclub for all
intents and purposes.

53 Restaurant, ENCYCLOPEDIA. COM, available at
<http://www.encyclopedia.com/htmllrllrestaura.asp.> (last visited Sept. 14, 2002).
54 Anthony Conners, Delmonico's Lives Again, DAILY NEWS SUNDAY EXTRA, May 17,
1998, at 52.
55 See generally State v. Freeman, 38 N.H. 426 (N.H. 1859).
56 [d.
57 State v. Freeman, 38 N.H. 426, 426 (N.H. 1859).
58 [d. at 427.
59 [d. at 428.
·60 Creedon v. Lunde, 90 F. Supp. 119, 121 (W.D. Wash. 1947).
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Due to creative conceptualization, present-day hospitality
entities are not as conventional or as easily distinguishable
from each other as they once were. 61 Yet, contracts and
statutes continue to define entities ambiguously, forcing the
courts to look elsewhere to interpret intent and construct
definitions.62 When the court is interpreting an imprecise term
in a contract or statute, the court must unearth and apply the
commonly understood meaning of the term. 63 As previously
revealed, however, commonly understood meanings in the
hospitality industry are not so common any longer. 64 In spite of
this, modern day courts continually utilize outdated historical
definitions to ascertain commonly understood meanings of
hospitality entities,65 even though it was held, almost one
hundred years ago, that adherence to ancient definitions of
hospitality entities is not an effective practice. 66

II.

PROBLEMATIC HISTORICAL DEFINITIONS

Inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, bars, nightclubs and
cabarets are the hospitality terms of art that tend to create the
most confusion. In addition to overlapping characteristics,
several historical definitions can be found for each hospitality
entity further complicating the courts application of dated
historical definitions. The following are typical ambiguous
historical definitions and illustrative cases in which courts
utilize unbridled discretion to reach extraordinary judicial
interpretation.

See generally John Mariani, Roadside Attractions; History of Diners, RESTAURANT
May, 1992.
62 See generally Creedon v. Lunde, 90 F. Supp. 119, 120 (W.D. Wash. 1947); Vitolo
v. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
63 See generally Vitolo v. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
64
Creedon v. Lunde, 90 F. Supp. 119, 120 (W.D. Wash. 1947). In this case, the
court found that the historical definitions between hotel and apartment-house were so
similar that they were not helpful. Id.
65 Vitolo v. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51, 57-8 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). The court looked to
dictionaries to find the definition of "restaurant" and "drive-in." If these definitions had
been taken seriously, the court would have held that a "drive-in" is a "restaurant"
without parking spaces. Id.
66 Nelson v. Johnson, 116 N.W. 828, 829 (Minn. 1908).
61

HOSPITALITY,
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A. INN
One historical definition described an "inn" as "[a] house
for entertainment of travelers and passengers, in which a
lodging and necessities are provided for them and for their
horses and attendants."67 This definition conceives a "hotel" as
an entity independent of an "inn."68 Contrast this with the
opinion in YMCA of Greater N. Y. McBurney Branch v. Plotkin,
which found that "hotel" is tantamount to "inn."69 In that case,
to recover rent overcharges and treble damages, pursuant to a
statute regulating hotels requiring the posting of a room rate,
the court required the plaintiff to prove that the YMCA was
operating as either a "hotel" or an "inn."70 The New York Civil
Court found the YMCA was subject to this statute, reasoning
that the facility rents rooms to transient guests in conjunction
with the commonly understood meaning of hotel or inn.71
Although it was only a peripheral issue in this case, the court
stated that the terms "hotel" and "inn" were synonymous and
refer to places where "transient guests are received and
lodged."72 Despite decisions like this, the distinctions between
"hotel" and "inn" are often embraced in other cases. 73
B. HOTEL
Black's Law Dictionary defines a hotel as "[a] building
where lodging and usually meals, entertainment and various
personal services are provided for the public."74 An airport,
casino, homeless shelter or even a shopping mall could fit
within this definition.75 Similarly, in Greentree at Murray Hill
Condo. v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, a group of
67
Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly (N.Y) 25, 3 Abb. Pro 26 (Ct. C.P.N.Y. Co. 1867),
referencing Thompson V. Lacy (3 B. & A 238), reprinted in JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE
LAWS OF INNKEEPERS 17 (3rd 1993).
68 Id.
69 YMCA of Greater N.Y. McBurney Branch V. Plotkin, 519 N.y'S.2d 518 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1987).
70 Id.
71
Id.
72 Id. cited in Dixon V. Robbins 246 N.Y. 169 (1927).
73 Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17,23 (N.J. 1955).
74 THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 359 (New ed.1994).
75 West Edmonton Mall in Edmonton, Alberta provides a hotel, 3. movies theatres,
ice skating rink and many attractions. <http://www.westedmall.com> (last visited Feb.
20,2003).
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condominium owners attempted to enjoin a neighboring church
for operating as a non-permitted "hotel" under a city zoning
ordinance. 76
The plaintiffs argued that by housing the
homeless, the church's charity was tantamount to the operation
of a hotel. 77 Using a dictionary for guidance, the New York
Supreme Court declared the commonly understood definition of
a hotel to be "a house which is held out to well-behaved
members of the traveling public, who are willing to pay
reasonable rates for accommodations, as a place where they
will be received and entertained as guests for compensation,
and will be furnished with food, drink, and lodging, and
everything which they have occasion for while on their way."78
The court inferred that sleeping accommodations for
compensation, twenty-four hour desk, bellboy or telephone
service are prerequisites, set out by the historical definition, to
constitute a "hotel."79 These characteristics were absent from
the homeless shelter.8o Accordingly, the court viewed the
shelter as merely a permissible accessory use to the church; the
operation ofthe homeless shelter could continwi. 81

C. MOTEL
One dictionary defines a motel as, "[a] hotel in which the
rooms are accessible from the parking area,"82 while another
finds that a "hotel and motel are interchangeable and refers to
places that provide overnight accommodations to transients."83
The language "overnight accommodations to transients" can
encompass any sort of public accommodation, even
campgrounds. In a Rhode Island case, a developer sued a
zoning review board to allow the construction of a motel. 84 The
plaintiff argued that since a hotel was a permitted use, a motel
76 Greentree at Murray Hill Condo. v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, 550
N.y'S.2d 981,984 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
77 Id. at 985.
78 Id. at 986. (emphasis added).
79

80
81

Id.
Id.
Id.

THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 480 (New ed.1994). (Emphasis added).
NORMAN G. COURNOYER ET AL., HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND TRAVEL LAW 572 (5th
Edition 1998).
84 Barbara Realty Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the City of Cranston, 138 A.2d 818,
823 (H.1. 1958).
82

83
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should also be permitted. 85 The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island did not refer to any historical definitions before it held
that a motel was the equivalent of a hotel. 86 The court
explained that in the absence of any specific definitions
contrary to this notion, a motel was a permissible use and could
be constructed. 87

D. RESTAURANT
One historical definition states that a restaurant is "[a]
place where meals are served to the public."88 Many entities
can be classified as a "restaurant" under this definition,
including a soup kitchen, cafe, hotdog stand, grocery store, or
even a bowling alley. The tenant's lease in Fulway Corp. u.
Liggett Drug Company involved a restrictive covenant that
prohibited the premises to operate as a luncheonette with a
soda fountain. 89 The lease was silent as to whether the
premises could be used as a "restaurant."90 The New York
Civil Court, however, considered several definitions and held
that a restaurant is "a place which serves, through waiters or
waitresses, full meals or food specialties, totally or principally
at tables, in comfortable surroundings, and where the food is
not prepared, cooked and served from apparatus open and
visible to the customer."91 A luncheonette would seem to
embody this definition. The New York Civil Court, using its
discretion, distinguished the entities. 92
Reasoning that
"restaurant service was intended to be leisurely, whereas ...
luncheonette service" is swift with a high customer turnover,
the court prohibited the "luncheonette" from operating on the
premises. 93

85

86
87

Id.
Id.
Id.

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1108 (New
College ed. 1976).
89 Fulway Corp. v. Liggett Drug Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225-6 (N.Y. Special Term
1956).
90 Id. at 226.
91 Id. at 230.
88

92
93

Id.
Id. at 231.
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E. BAR OR BARROOM
A dictionary defines a bar as "[a] room or entity whose
main feature is a bar for the sale of liquor."94 This elusive
definition encompasses a wide variety of businesses selling
liquor such as wineries, nightclubs, cabarets, some restaurants
and possibly liquor stores. When an ordinance in Hall Drive
Ins, Inc., v. City Ft. Wayne restricted smoking in "restaurants,"
but did allow smoking in ''bars,'' the Indiana Supreme Court
analyzed whether the city correctly charged the plaintiff with
violating the ordinance when he allowed smoking in his
restaurant's bar.95 Although shared characteristics easily
muddy the water of an entity's definitions, the court noted that
the restaurant's bar was not in a separate enclosure. 96
Accordingly, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the bar
exception to the smoking ordinance did not apply to this
"restaurant."97

F. NIGHTCLUB
Webster's dictionary defines a nightclub as, "[a] place of
entertainment open at night usually serving food and liquor
and providing music for dancing."98
Restaurants, bars,
cabarets, cruise ships and even resorts often contain all of
these characteristics. In Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's Inc., a
city sued a defendant who converted a restaurant into a nonpermitted discotheque. 99 The New Jersey Supreme Court
acknowledged that "discotheque" was a new entity in the
hospitality industry and had characteristics that the court was
not readily familiar with. loO As a result, the court struggled to
find the common meaning of "discotheque."lol The introduction
of new entities into the marketplace presents difficulties for
courts to employ any definition. Initially, the New Jersey
Supreme Court examined dictionary definitions and found that

96

THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 73 (New ed. 1994).
Hall Drive Ins, Inc. v. City of Ft. Wayne, 773 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2002).
[d. at 259.

97

[d.

98

THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 497 (New ed. 1994).
Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's Inc., 416 A.2d 388, 389 (N.J. 1980).
[d. at 389.
[d. at 389·90.

94
95

99
100

101
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"a discotheque is a small intimate nightclub for dancing to
recorded music; broadly: a nightclub often featuring
psychedelic and mixed-media attractions (as slides, movies and
special lighting effects). "102 To justify its decision, the court
held that hospitality entities must be analyzed in their totality
by focusing on the "quality, character and intensity of the use,"
instead of on historical definitions.103 Therefore, the court held
that the entity was a "discotheque" because of the number of
tables, the music volume, how it was advertised, the presence
of a cover charge, and that the primary purpose was for
dancing.l 04 Since discotheques were a non-permitted use, the
court found the defendant in violation of the city's zoning
ordinance and required him to apply for a zoning variance to
continue operating. l05
G. CABARET

Although nude dancing is historically the primary purpose
of a cabaret, one dictionary defines a "cabaret" as identical with
a "nightclub."106 The owner of a nude dancing club challenged
the constitutionality of an ordinance requiring licenses for
adult cabarets. l07 The city ordinance defined a cabaret as an
entity intending to "sexually stimulate any member of the
public."108
This proposed definition could include the
restaurant Hooters, any nightclub with professional dancers,
stores with erotic literature, and potentially movie houses.

III. CONFUSION OF THE ENTITIES AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
This Comment accounts for the amorphous character of the
industry and strives to guide individuals, businesses and
legislative bodies in composing sound definitions. By properly
defining and utilizing explicit restrictive covenants and
permitted uses, the ability to draft definitions that are
102

103

Id. at 390.
Id.

104

Id. at 390.

105

Id. at 393.

106

THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 176 (New ed. 1994).

See generally Keith Ervin, Adult Entertainment Returns to Agenda for Bellevue
Council, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at Bl.
108 Id.
107
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consistent with the intent of all interested parties is
enhanced. lo9 The incorporation of restrictive covenants and
permitted uses into the definition of a hospitality term also
reduces ambiguity and sets clear parameters for the intended
business's operation. 110 As a result, unintended breaches are
avoided and the potential for litigation is reduced.
As demonstrated in Part I,111 increasing urbanization and
creative conceptualization gave rise to a large number of
various hospitality entities.1 l2 Overlapping characteristics
often occur in modern hospitality entities, making it almost
impossible to rely on historical definitions.1 l3 These changes in
modern life require that courts acknowledge the reality of the
relationship between customer and business, instead of
adhering to rigid historical definitions.1 l4 Hospitality terms of
art that ignore the dynamic nature of the entity often result in
legal conflicts.115 Consequently, modern innovation and its
confusing collection of hospitality entities necessitate the need
for clear definitions in statutes and contracts.1 l6
If a contract or statute contains a vague hospitality
definition, distinguishing among the entities becomes a
question of fact to be determined by the court.117 As seen in
Part II,118 ambiguity in hospitality definitions routinely results
in unpredictable outcomes in the courtroom as the decisions
are often based on "commonly understood meanings" drawn
from dated historical definitions.1 l9 When authors sufficiently
define the entity in the contract or statute, however, the court
must look to that definition alone. l2o

109 See generally Fulway Corp. v. Liggett Drug Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 222, (N.Y. Special
Term 1956).
110 [d.
11l
See supra notes 29-66 and accompanying text.
112
See generally Creedon v. Lunde, 90 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Wash. 1947).
113
See generally Fulway Corp. v. Liggett Drug Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. Special
Term 1956).
114
Nelson v. Johnson, 116 N.W. 828, 829 (Minn. 1908).
116
See generally [d.
116
See generally [d.
117
See generally Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House, 224 A.D. 232, 237 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1928). The court uses the circumstances of the conflict, or the intent of the
parties, or both. [d.
11B
See supra notes 67-108 and accompanying text.
119
Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House, 224 A.D. 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928).
120 Montella v. City of Ottertail, 633 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
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A "restaurant" to most people would not include a machine
in a hallway which delivers a food item with the push of a
button. Yet, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided a
vending machine was a "restaurant," because the applicable
statute specifically stated "food vending machines" were an
applicable taxable "restaurant" in its definition. 121
By
specifically listing permitted and restricted uses for a
particular entity, authors can construct clear and unambiguous
descripStions of allowable operations and therefore, circumvent
judicial interpretation or even prevent litigation.
A. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS IN CONTRACTS
The customary contractual varieties utilized in the
hospitality industry where vague legal definitions or terms of
art frequently give rise to conflict are leases,122 owner or
management contracts,123 and franchise agreements.l 24
Similarly, in Oak Hills Property v. Saga Restaurants, the
restaurant owner's sublease provided that access to the
attached parking easement was available only if the premises
operated as a restaurant.l 25 As the lease did not define a
"restaurant" explicitly, the court used the commonly
understood definition. 126 The property owner proposed that the
commonly understood definition of a restaurant was "a
business establishment which derives at least 51 percent of its
gross revenues from the sale of food and non-alcoholic
beverages; and which does not sell alcohol other than as an
accompaniment to meals or to individuals generally awaiting
tables for food service in an area of the structure that does not
exceed 25% of the customer floor area."127 This definition

121
Cagan's Inc. v. N.H. Dep't. of Revenue Admin., 490 A.2d 1354, 1356 (N.H. 1985).
The statute further defined a restaurant as an eating establishment where food, food
products, or beverages including alcoholic beverages are served and for which a charge
is made. [d.
122 Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App. 1989). A landlord
allowed the operation of a "restaurant," but not a "nightclub" on the premises, but did
not define the mentioned entities. [d.
123 Thacher Hotel, Inc. v. Economos, 197 A.2d 59 (Maine 1964).
124 First & First, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., No. 90·1060 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7432 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
125 Oak Hills Prop. v. Saga Rest. Inc, 940 S.W.2d 243,244 (Tex. App. 1997).
126 [d. at 245.
127 [d. at 244·5.
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encompassed specialized proposals, however, which were
neither commonly understood meanings, nor terms intended by
the parties. i28 The court refused to declare the property
owner's proposed commonly understood meaning and the
restaurant was allowed to use the parking easement. 129
Providing a definition detailing acceptable uses or restrictive
covenants would have prevented this result.
Other contracts that often give rise to conflicts over terms
of art in the hospitality industry are management contracts. In
Thacher Hotel u. Economos, the definition of "hotel" in a statute
controlling liquor licenses became relevant when the hotel sued
a manager for breach of a management contract.130 The
manager contended that the contract was void in light of a
liquor license statute, which required that licenses be issued
only to bona fide hotels. 131 The manager reasoned that since
the entity was not a bona fide hotel it was not entitled to a
liquor license. 132 If this premise was correct, the "management
contract" dealt with an unlawful enterprise and was therefore
void,133 The court found that since the statute expressly
included "eating places controlled by the manager" in its
definition of bona fide hotel, the contract was enforceable. 134
Due to the precise definition in the contract, the court
concluded that the "hotel" was bona fide for the sale of liquor
consumption on the premises,135 As a result, the court upheld
the management contract. 136
Definitions of hospitality entities are also relevant in
franchise agreements. When Dunkin' Donuts attempted to buy
another donut chain, Mr. Donut, plaintiff consumers asked for
a preliminary injunction claiming the purchase was an antiId. at 244.
Id.
130 Thacher Hotel, Inc. v. Economos, 197 A.2d 59 (Maine 1964).
131 Id. at 60.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. The Maine Revenue Statute defines hotel as "any reputable place operated by
responsible persons of good reputation, where the public, for a consideration, obtains
sleeping accommodations and meals under one roof and which has a public dining room
or rooms operated by the same management open and serving food during the morning,
afternoon and evening, and a kitchen, apart from the public dining room or rooms, in
which food is regularly prepared for the public on the same premises." Id.
135 Id. at 64.
136 Id.
128
129
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trust violation.1 37 In determining whether the acquisition
would lessen competition or create a monopoly in the fast food
sector, the court heard witnesses testify as to the definition of
the franchises.1 38 One expert witness stated that a Dunkin'
Donuts restaurant does not fall neatly into any single
hospitality definition because it had characteristics of a bakery,
sit-down restaurant and fast food enterprise. 139 Due in part to
the entity spanning across many different types of enterprises,
the court found there were no anticompetitive effects from the
acquisition. 140
B. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS IN STATUTES

Hospitality terms of art and vague legal definitions give
rise to a wide variety of conflicts in statutes. Conflicts
generally arise over the application of zoning ordinances
concerning
sexually
oriented
businesses,141
smoking
143
ordinances,142 and granting of liquor licenses.
In 1970, a New York zoning board revoked a restaurant's
building permit.l44 The New York Superior Court examined
whether the establishment was a "restaurant," which was a
permitted-use, or a non-permitted "drive-in restaurant."145
Since precise descriptions of these entities were absent, the
court analyzed the dictionary definitions to distinguish
between the terms.146 The inadequacy and vagueness of the
definitions forced the court to consider attributes like seating
capacity, permanency of the building, toilet facilities, parking
facilities, and intercom equipment. 147 These characteristics

137 First & First, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., No. 90·1060, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7432 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
138 See generally Id. at *125·6.
139 Id. at *130.
140
Id. at *26l.
141 Tily B. Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 10·11 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
142 Samara Kalk Der, Smoking Debate Heats Up; Restaurateurs Cool to New Rules,
THE CAPITAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at 1A.
143 Kraincic v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the City of Willoughby Hills, No. 94·L·113,
1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 930 (Ohio App. Ct. 1990).
144 Vitolo v. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (N.Y. App. Div.1970).
146
Id. at 54·55.
146
Id. at 57.
147
Id. at 59.
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embodied those of a drive-in, which the building lacked.1 48 As
the premises did not have any attributes of a non-permitted
"drive-in restaurant," the building was completed and operated
as the proposed restaurant. 149
Other statutory concerns over hospitality entities arise in
liquor licensing requirements. In Krainic v. Board of Zoning
Appeals of Willoughby Hills, for example, the city required the
nightclub to serve a minimal amount of food to its patrons to
obtain a liquor license.1 5o
The city, however, regarded
foodservice as effectively turning the nightclub into a
"restaurant," which was not a permitted use under the
license. 151 As there were no specific definitions of "restaurant"
or "nightclub" set forth in the ordinance for guidance, the city
denied the zoning certificate. 152 Without securing the proper
licenses first, the proposed nightclub could not be built.153
Smoking ordinances also present a problem.
When
Madison, Wisconsin passed an ordinance restricting smoking in
restaurants, some restaurants constructed special ventilated
rooms costing thousands of dollars to comply with the new
law.1 54 A short while later, the city passed another ordinance
that restricted smoking completely from "restaurants" and the
newly constructed ventilated rooms became useless. 155
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENTITIES

Some courts recognize the futility of relying upon historical
definitions and commonly understood meanings for hospitality
entities. 156
As a result, these courts evaluate various
characteristics of the entities to determine whether they fall
within the scope of the term of art stated in the contract or
statute. 157 These characteristics include the entity's primary
Id.
Id. at 60.
150 Kraincic v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the City of Willoughby Hills, No. 94-L-1l3,
1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 930, at *2 (Ohio App. Ct. 1990).
151
Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Samara Kalk Der, Smoking Debate Heats Up; Restaurateurs Cool to New Rules,
THE CAPITAL TiMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at 1A.
148
149

155

156
157

Id.
Vitolo v. Chave, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51,57-58 (N.Y. App. Div.1970).
Id. at 59.
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purpose, the manner in which the entity portrays itself, the
effects on the surrounding community, the customer base, the
characteristics of the operation, specified sales percentages,
and the name used by the entity.
Although these
characteristics are certainly helpful when interpreting the
commonly understood definition of hospitality entities, they
still leave too much room for discretionary interpretation.

1. Primary Purpose
The primary purpose of an organization is one factor courts
use to interpret vague or omitted definitions of hospitality
entities. 158 Utilizing the primary purpose with specificity in
the definitions promotes a consistent standard. 159 Preventing
litigation, however, requires a detailed illustration of how the
premises should be maintained. 160 Interested parties and
courts understand precisely what conduct is prohibited or
permitted via restrictive covenants and permitted uses in
definitions of hospitality entities.
When using the primary purpose to get desired results,
authors do not always succeed in incorporating the spirit of the
agreement. 161 The city of Clifton, New Jersey attempted to
keep out a 7-Eleven by claiming it was a non-permitted fastfood entity.1 62 The zoning board reasoned that since people
place orders for coffee, muffins and slurpees to go, the entity
was primarily engaged in preparing fast food. 163 The court
found that this was not 7-Eleven's primary purpose and the
business was allowed to operate. 164 Although the fast-food
ordinance identified its primary purpose, the attempt at
specificity did not achieve the creator's goals. 165 Instead, the

158
See generally Kraincic v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the City of Willoughby Hills,
No. 94-L-113, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 930, at *6 (Ohio App. Ct. 1990).
159 Tily B., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6,11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
160
[d. at 11-12.
161
See generally Kraincic v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the City of Willoughby Hills,
No. 94-L-113, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 930, at *6 (Ohio App. Ct. 1990).
162
Josh Gohlke, Clifton Loses Battle to Stop 7 Eleven, THE RECORD, Dec. 19, 2000, at
Ll.
163
[d.
164
[d.
165 [d.
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use of the words "primary purpose" implies that there must
also be secondary uses. 166

2. Sales Percentages
Authors of contracts and statutes often define entities by
utilizing sales percentages of a certain category, such as food or
beverage sales. 167 Including sales percentages in a hospitality
definition is helpful to limit the occurrence of certain activities,
such as alcoholic beverage consumption or even smoking.
Madison, Wisconsin altered the definition of "restaurant" in the
previously mentioned smoking ordinance by increasing the
acceptable percentage of beverage alcohol from thirty-three
percent to fifty percent. 168 As a result, entities that patrons
. believed were bars essentially transformed into restaurants
and thus, became subject to the ordinance restricting
smoking. 169
Courts also utilize sales percentages to determine if the
business is run according to the primary purpose set out in a
contract or statute. When a landlord brought an action for
breach of a lease in Ray-Ron Corp. v. DMY Realty Co., the
Supreme Court of Indiana evaluated whether the tenant was
using the premises outside the permitted use of the restaurant
when he installed arcade games. 170 The court used sales
percentages to determine whether the "commonly understood
meaning" of restaurant precludes a proprietor from providing
any more than food or drink. 171 Although the lease did not
require a certain percentage of sales, the Supreme Court of
Indiana reasoned that a pizza entity did not breach its lease by
having video games on the premises, because it received
ninety-four percent of its revenue from food and drink sales.172
In addition, the court stated, arbitrarily, that if the pizza
restaurant were to derive two-thirds of its income, instead of
166 Rose Ltd. Liability Co. v. Watertown Planning, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2710,
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997).
167 Samara Kalk Der, Smoking Debate Heats Up; Restaurateurs Cool to New Rules,
THE CAPITAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at lA.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Ray-Ron Corp. v. DMY Realty Co., 500 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (Ind. 1986).
171
Id. at 1166.
172 Id.
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the actual six percent, from video game machines, then it
might be in violation of its lease. 173 To preclude the use of the
arcade games, the landlord should have prohibited any sales
outside food and beverage in the lease.
Even though sales percentages help determine how an
operation is being run or how it is expected to function, they
can be difficult to track and often do not reflect the true intent
of the parties,174 Further, many courts dislike using sales or
other ratios as the controlling factors in the determination
because doing so can induce an entity to conform its internal
business operations to the specified percentage ratio. 175

3. Space Allocation
Authors of contracts, legislators, and courts may specify
the definitions of hospitality terms of art with physical space
allocation. The capricious nature of this requirement is a
battle for courts and parties. For example, in Newport Beach,
California, an entity that uses thirty-two percent of its space
for nude dancing is considered a cabaret, and thus, a nonpermitted use under the city's ordinance. 176 If that same
proprietor reduced the space used for nude dancing down to
twenty percent, use of the premises would be considered an
eating entity, which is approved under the ordinance.177
In addition, the overall goal of a contract or statute is
compromised when relying on space allocation. For example,
in State ex reI. Edmond Meany Hotel, Inc. u. City of Seattle, an
owner contracted to sell its fourteen story hotel to a retirement
home.1 78 The city claimed the new use constituted a nonpermitted "home for the retired" and not an allowable
"hotel."179 The relevant statute defined the "hotel" as using
"fifty percent of its habitable floor area for sleeping."18o The

Id.
See generally Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 867 (Tex. App.
1989).
175 Id.
176 Tily B., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
177 Id.
178 State ex reI. Edmond Meany Hotel, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 402 P.2d 486, 487
(Wash. 1965).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 489.
173

174
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city contended that since the retirement home did not utilize
this percentage of space, it was an unacceptable use. 18l
Although the retirement home was not permitted for other
reasons, the court declared that a building is not a hotel merely
because of a haphazard percentage limiting the area used for
sleeping in its definition. 182

4. Name
In conflicts over the definition of hospitality
establishments, the name is usually taken into consideration.
Perhaps the least regarded characteristic of an entity is its
name,183 such as where the property is listed in the yellow
pages, how the entity advertises itself or the term is stated on a
publicly displayed sign. 184 The property owner in Friedman v.
Schindler's Prairie House argued that the building was not a
hotel under an applicable fire-safety statute.l 85 The New York
Civil Court found the name "house" instead of "hotel" was not
determinative of its genuine nature. 186 Therefore, although
what an entity is called is often taken into consideration,
generally, it is not controlling in determining whether the
entity falls within the definition.187
The actual characteristics of an operation carry more
weight than the name in determining whether the entity comes
within the legal definition. 188 In Schindler's Prairie House, the
court examined the other characteristics of its operation, which
included an office, a large dining room, a thoroughly equipped
kitchen, a billiard room and a dance hall. 189 The court
reasoned that guests of hotels are often furnished not only with
lodging, but meals and entertainment, including music,
dancing and certain sports. 190 Since the maintained building

181
182

183
184

185
186

187
188
189
190

Id. at 488.
Id. at 499.
Nelson v. Johnson, 116 N.W. 828 (Minn. 1908).
See generally Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's Inc., 416 A2d 388, 390 (N.J. 1980).
Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House, 224 AD. 232, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928).
Id. at 236.
Moyer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 A2d 311, 318 (Me. 1967).
Id.
Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House, 224 AD. 232, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928).
Id at 236.
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encompassed these characteristics, the court held that the
hotel fell within the meaning of the statute. 191

IV. PROACTIVE DESCRIPTION
As shown above, reliance upon terms of art, dated
historical definitions or "commonly understood meanings" of
hospitality establishments is not an effective method when
drafting contracts or statutes. Instead of allowing courts to
determine which factors are appropriate for hospitality
entities, authors should utilize descriptions of authorized uses
and restrictive covenants to clearly establish the parameters of
a permissible operation. Rather than trying "to distinguish
between all the major hospitality entities, the proactive
descriptions set forth below have collapsed the terms of art into
the two categories of "lodging" and "food and beverage." The
following are examples of permitted uses or restricted
covenants that should be considered and utilized when drafting
contracts or statutes to avoid conflicts.

Accommodations
Overnight
Minimum Number of Hours
Minimum Number of
DaysfWeekslMonthsPayment
Guest
.
Collection and Payment of
Occupancy Taxes
Membership

The Sale of Food Prepared
On Site
Menu
The Sale of Prepackaged Food

Rooms

Sale of Alcoholic Beverages
1. Beer by the Glass (tap) or
Bottle
2. Wine by the Glass or Bottle
3. Liquor by the Drink or
Bottle
4. Price
Restrictions/Happy
Hours

Service System
1. Table
2. Counter
3. Take-out
4.

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

191

Accessibility from a Central
Lobby
Number
Size
Amenities
Private Bath in Room
Computer Outlets
V·

[d. at 236-7.
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Common Ingress and Egress

Dancing
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Specific Types of Entertainment
Allowed
1. Sporting Activities
2. Music
a. Pre-recorded music
b. Disc-Jockey
c. Types of Live
Music
d. Volume Level
Allowed
3. Dancing
a. By the Public
b. By Employee
c. Allowable Square
feet dedicated to
dance floor
d. Allowable number
of dance areas
e. Clothing
requirement
4. Health Club
5. Pool
6. Tennis Courts
7. Spa Services
8. Hours of Op_eration Allowed
Extent of Food and Beverage service
1. Restaurant on site
2. Room Service
3. Bar
4. Outdoor Dining/Beverage
Service
5. Mini-Bars in Rooms
6. On/Off Premises Catering
Extent of Other Services
1. Laundry
2. Concierge
3. Child Care
4. Valet/Self-Parking
Objective
Quality
Criteria
Established by the AAA and Mobile
Rating Guide

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss2/2

By the Public
By Employee
Allowable
square
feet
dedicated to a dance floor.
Allowable number of dance
areas
Clothing Requirement
Special
Effects
(fog
machine strobe lights)

Music
1.

2.
3.

4.

Pre-recorded music
Disc-Jockey
Types of Live Music
Volume Level Allowed

Smoking Restrictions
Age Restrictions
Parking Requirements
Membership Requirements

Hours of Operation
Parking

Objective
Quality
Criteria
Established by the AAA and Mobile
Rating Guide
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V. CONCLUSION
Assuming that hospitality terms in contracts and statutes
are self-explanatory leads to serious and unexpected
consequences. Non-descriptive terms of art often lead the court
to use historical definitions and "commonly understood
meanings" to interpret the intent of the parties and legislators.
Due to the ever-changing nature of the hospitality industry,
"commonly understood meanings," such as "restaurant" or
"hotel" are not so common anymore. Historical definitions are
outdated.
Since this approach results in unpredictable
outcomes, legislatures and contracting parties should instead
be more specific when drafting. Utilizing restrictive covenants
and specific permitted uses enhances the ability to draft
definitions that are consistent with the intent of all interested
parties.
All affected stakeholders can incorporate any
intentions in the contract or statute with a proactive utilization
of the descriptions set forth in Part IV.l92 The use of these and
other applicable permitted and restrictive covenants prevents
litigation because it allows drafters to communicate their
purposes and assist interested parties to appreciate the
designed expectations or limitations.
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